In his home in the urban center of the Gwangju Metropolitan Area, known for its seafood and its art and cultural scene, I talked with 21-year-old college sophomore Jang Seung-hoo. He discussed his political beliefs that interestingly opposes the voting pattern of the region he lives in where 91% of the residents support the 더불어민주당 or Democratic Party of Korea (DPK).

“저는 공화당 같이 이제 보수쪽을 지지하긴 해요.” Jang specifies, “국민의힘 지지하고 있습니다. 지금 윤석열 대통령을 집권 여당으로 만든 그 국민의 힘.”

He explains why he’s conservative in a Democratic stronghold. “그 정당을 왜 지지하냐면, 일단은 저는 경제 쪽을 최우선으로 두거든요. 누구는 뭐 복지 이제 해주는 걸 좋아하고, 뭐, 웰페어; 그런 거 해주는 거 좋아하지만 저는 일단 경제성장을 최우선으로 두거든요. 근데, 보통 민주당이 집권을 하면, 경제 이제 주식 주가가, 스톡이, 막 엄청 오르는 게 아니라, 그 부동산 쪽이 많이 오르거든요. 그래서, 저는 그 현상을 별로 좋아하지 않아서 경제적으로는 좀 더 합리적인 그 보수쪽을 지지하고 있습니다.”

Translation: “I do support the conservative side.” Jang specifies “I support the People Power Party. The People Power Party that made Yoon Suk-yeol president.”

He explains why he’s conservative in a Democratic stronghold. “The reason I support that party is, first of all, I prioritize the economy. Some people like welfare now, but I put economic growth first. But, usually, when the Democratic Party holds power, instead of stock prices going up, real estate goes up. Because I don't like that outcome, economically, I support the more economically rational conservative side.”

21-year-old student studying AI Engineering at Chosun University, Jang Seung-hoo

His stance holds poignant in the context of the neighborhood and region where he and his family was born and raised in. Beyond its reputation for art, Gwangju is also the epicenter of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement, or more commonly known as the Gwangju Uprising, where Gwangju citizens formed militias in resistance against General Chun Doo-hwan’s indiscriminate killing of citizens in an effort to establish a military dictatorship. The uprising ended in the innocent bloodshed of the Gwangju civilian militia.

Despite South Korea’s rich and convoluted political history, South Korean voters, especially young voters, are apathetic, disengaged and skeptical of their democratic system, a system that was borne out of a democratization movement where young people of the same age bore arms to establish just 45 years ago. This distrust combined with South Korea’s cultural norms and practices has made politics a non-subject and almost a taboo one in many social circles, communities and age groups.

“적극적으로 표출을 잘 안 하거든요. 자신이 무슨 당이다, 그걸 적극적으로 표현 안 하려고 해요,” Jang explains.

“일단 이공삼공 세대들은, 이십대, 삼십대들은, 잘 안 하려고 하거든요. 그걸로 인해서, 좀 정치와랑 얘기가 약간 한국적 분야 문화에서는 조금 민감한 문제이기도 하고. 서로 당 자체, 두 당이 안 좋아하거든요. 그래서, 싸움, 분쟁 같은 게 일어나게 될 수가 많다 보니까…보통 사람들은, 뭐 예를 들어 미국이나, 공화당, 민주당 확실하게 모두 다 지지하잖아요. 근데 자기는 어디든 상관없다, 뭐 중도다, 얘기하면서 보통 다 어느 쪽 성향을 갖고 있긴 해요. 한국에서는 잘 지지를 안 하는 상태…그 지지를 하더라도, 표출을 안하는 – 그런 사회현상이 있어요.”

Translation: “They don't really express it actively. They try not to actively express what party they are,” Jang explains.

“First of all, the 20/30 generation–people in their twenties and thirties–try to not express it. Because of that, discussing politics is a bit of a sensitive topic in South Korean culture. Also, the two parties don't like each other. As a result, it can cause a lot of fights and disputes…usually people, for example in the US, definitively support either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party. But for us, if someone doesn’t care about either party, is moderate, is neither conservative nor liberal, as we talk with each other, we can assume what they support. Korea is in a state where people don’t really support political parties…even if people do support one party, they don't express it – that’s part of our cultural norm.”

22-year-old student studying Computer Science at the University of Southern California, Chang Si-on

Chang Si-on, a South Korean national who moved to the United States at 18 years old to study computer science, is very clear about his nihilism in South Korean politics. When describing his personal sentiments around the 2022 Presidential Election in South Korea, Chang felt that he was voting to decide “between a dumb ass or a criminal.”

Ultimately, Chang chose the “dumbass.”

“Yoon, he wasn't qualified as much as the other guy. The other guy had a very tough upbringing, and he quote, unquote, fights for people's rights. That's why a lot of people favor him, especially the working class. But throughout history, you know, they're all criminals. This guy has had some sketchy things happening around him while he was a District Counselor.”

While Yoon wasn’t the “brightest tool in the shed,” Chang believes that “he had a little bit of trouble throughout his presidency. I do agree that he was treated very unfairly, but that's Korean politics. It’s not so much, let's actually fix these problems; it's more, yeah, fuck you, fuck me, let's fuck everyone. I want power. So, if Yoon had power, the other party was going to try to fuck him over; they didn’t care about getting anything passed. That's the whole agenda that both the parties have.”

At least among younger South Korean generations, this general sense of skepticism, disbelief and apathy towards politics and government comes at a costly price. And Yoon demonstrated how significant that price can be. There is a recognition of the real corruption that plagues South Korean politics and this apathy is part of the reason why its democracy was so easily destabilized – people no longer see the point in being politically active when they believe that they won’t be able to make any realistic or tangible change.

DESTABILIZING SOUTH KOREAN DEMOCRACY

Freelance journalist Raphael Rashid

The political affiliations of young voters, or the lack thereof, has been made strikingly apparent in the context of South Korea’s seemingly abrupt instability. On December 3rd, 2024, at 10:27pm KST, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law in a public address. This was met with almost immediate backlash from both the National Assembly and the public.

Yoon justified his declaration as a means of preserving South Korea and its democracy against “threats posed by North Korea’s communist forces and to eliminate anti-state elements,” as stated in his address. Further, the president cited accusations against the Democratic Party, which currently holds the majority in the National Assembly, of conducting “anti-state activities and destroying the country by collaborating with North Korean communists and essentially, creating a legislative dictatorship.”

THE IMPLICATIONS OF MARTIAL LAW

Declaring martial law allows any sitting president to restrict “freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association” and to implement “special changes to the authority of governments or courts and a warrant system in accordance with the provisions of related laws.” This indicates an immediate stop to all political activities including protests, censorship of media and suppression of any act that the President considers a denial or an attempt “to overthrow the liberal democratic system.”

At its surface, martial law was made to preserve democracy or restore national peace. However, in the 16 times it has been enacted throughout South Korean history, martial law has been utilized as a method of militaristic cruelty and political suppression. Therefore, it is representative of a deeply rooted pain that was inflicted and is now carried by the civilian collective.

Martial law was first declared in South Korea in 1948 by military dictator Rhee Syng-man to crush a communist military rebellion that ended with over 2,000 civilian deaths. This set the precedent of how South Korean dictators would exploit martial law as an authoritarian tool over the next 40 years. The last time martial law was declared is infamously associated with one of, if not the most traumatic events in the South's history – when hundreds to thousands of university students, parents and other civilians alike were violently and indiscriminately killed under Chun Doo-hwan. 45 years later, the exact death toll remains unknown, yet the pain and trauma of the country’s democratization movement weigh on the surviving families as heavily as it did on May 18th, 1980.

Although Yoon’s declaration was reversed by the National Assembly after a mere six hours, the imposition of martial law calls back to this oppressive regime.

Professor of Sociology at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa Yang Myung-ji

“What Yoon Suk-yeol shows is a very military-based, authoritarian kind of government,” says Yang Myung-ji, Professor of Sociology at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa.

“As we could see in the hearing of the Constitutional Court, he commanded the arrests of critical politicians, and also stigmatized some cultural figures as ‘commies.’ This is basically demonizing the opposition."

THE AFTERMATH

In the immediate aftermath of Yoon’s declaration, police vehicles barricaded the front gate of the National Assembly Proceeding Hall and military troops forcibly entered by breaking a window. South Korean civilians and National Assembly members also gathered in front of the Proceeding Hall, periodically clashing with troops attempting to enter the building.

By 1am KST, the National Assembly passed a resolution with 190 out of 300 members in favor of lifting the martial law declaration. By 1:12am KST, soldiers stationed at the National Assembly withdrew.

On the morning of December 4th, the opposing party started impeachment proceedings for Yoon, and Parliament voted later that same week. On the street, thousands of civilians gathered to organize rallies, protests, strikes and vigils calling for Yoon’s impeachment.

On December 14th, the National Assembly passed the motion to impeach Yoon, suspending his presidential powers and duties. The Constitutional Court held its first formal hearing on the case on January 14th and Yoon was arrested on January 15th after his compound was raided. On January 19th, the Seoul Western District Court granted law enforcement’s request for a formal arrest warrant for Yoon whose subsequent arrest was met with his supporters violently breaking into the courthouse, damaging property and injuring police officers. And on January 26th, he was indicted for leading an insurrection, becoming the first sitting South Korean president to be arrested and indicted on these charges.

This storyline and its characters share uncanny parallels with the far-right movement in the United States, and that is because the South's far-right is inspired and derived from their American counterpart. Similar to Trump’s popular talking points, the far-right movement in South Korea also adopted identical rhetorics, in reaction to recent political events that have inadvertently caused the growth of the South's far-right.

Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan Hong Ji-yeon

Political Science Professor Hong Ji-yeon from the University of Michigan says that the most apparent origins of South Korea’s far-right movement are from the past 10 to 15 years. This includes President Moon Jae-in’s administration and his COVID policies and the simultaneous growth of both radical feminism and men’s rights advocacy.

“Participants of this movement were not that large because the movement was kind of violent and very emotionally charged at the beginning. And then, the turning point was Moon Jae-in’s administration and his COVID policy. The anti-COVID vaccine movement in the United States and similar ideas of vaccine conspiracy, accusations of the government using COVID as an excuse to control the population was an opportunity that expanded the movement to a larger context,” says Hong.

“The most recent phenomenon is the emerging young conservative generation. A lot of people argue they’re mostly male, but I'm not too convinced about whether we can just divide them into male and female. But, it's definite that those in their 20s, in terms of political ideology, are less progressive.”

But, looking at South Korea’s history, the actual origins of the conservative right-wing movement is traced all the way back to the 1950s, in the Cold War era. For most of South Korean history, the movement and its supporters, while still playing a significant role in politics, were mainly out of the public eye and at times, even dismissed. But, in the early 2000s, the South's “New Right” started to become louder and more organized – becoming something that was impossible for the rest of the country to ignore.

THE COST OF BEING APOLITICAL AND THE PLIGHT OF MODERATES

Trump’s growing prominence in politics and his ability to garner a base of unwavering support seems to have ushered in, or at least coincided with a global trend of resurging far-right nationalism over the last 10 years. With the Brothers of Italy, the Bharatiya Janata Party in India, and the Liberal Party in Brazil, to name a few, traditional Republicanism seems to have been overtaken by a far-right movement that is significantly more nationalist, violent, anti-communist, and anti-immigration.

This is exactly the case in South Korea where their far-right movement has become more organized, visible and vocal since the 2000s. While Trump’s popularity may have not been the sole cause of the New Right movement’s recent dominance of the public discourse, his reputation and subsequent popularity has served as great inspiration and motivation galvanizing South Korean right-wing supporters.

According to Hong, “There’s another aspect that's unique to South Korea—there is a very large pro-American culture. Whatever happens in the US can be seen as a good example for certain groups…As a movement, as a culture, the power of this activism in the US is very much giving a lot of power to the South's far-right movements as well.”

But with the increasing polarization between the political right and left, how will the voting patterns of moderates and centrists change? What kind of effect will it have on the apolitical?

Jang voted for Yoon because of his strong economic policies. But when asking Jang about Yoon’s supporters who stormed the Seoul Western District Courthouse, he responded, “그거는 폭동 아닌가? 제가 잘 몰라서 그런데, 그 생격으로 나온 거죠? 저는 어떠한 생각, 어떠한 입장에서도, 폭력을 동반한 시위는 민주적 시위가 아니고, 폭동이라 생각해서, 그런 짓은 하면 안 된다고 생각을 해요, 민주주의 정신을 해치는 방향이라.”

Translation: “Isn't that violence/riot? I don't know it very well, but it was started with that intention, right? Personally, with any perspective and position, a protest accompanied by violence is not a democratic protest, I view it as a riot, and I think that no one should be doing it because it damages the health of democracy.”

Chang, who also voted for Yoon, says, “In the end, he made a very dumb play. And he deserves to be impeached…but, yeah, I would still vote for the conservative candidate if it comes up again.”

“I get the sentiment (of the rioters), but I can’t agree with (them) for obvious reasons. But, Korean lawmakers are not lawmakers. They're more of, who’s the best marketer to get power? That’s why I also get the sentiment.”

He continues to explain, “I think there's no right answer because when a protest happens in Korea, nothing happens. And, now that they do this, they're blamed, right? So, there's no right answer. If you do nothing because you're frustrated, nothing happens, if you do the wrong thing, then you're blamed…I don't regret voting for him. I still believe if Lee Jae-myung gets elected this next cycle, Korea will be in an even worse place.”

Like Jang and Chang, the voting choices of many South Korean moderates seem almost inherently self-contradictory – they are fiscally conservative but don’t condone violence. However, this contradiction isn’t the result of voters picking and choosing what values to compromise, rather it’s the direct result of a loss of faith, at least among younger voters, in the current system. It’s both a historical and modern trend representative of a global disinterest in politics, especially among younger generations. Further torn by increasingly polarized sides, political parties are not only wondering how to strategize targeting this group, but also, it begs the question, how healthy is this for democracy? What will it take to regain young support in democracy?

Historically, young people in their 20s and 30s, especially university students, have been at the forefront of South Korea’s largest movements, including its democratization. At a time of authoritarian suppression, when young people had even less of a reason to have faith, their instinctive reaction was to push back instead of to disengage.

A student sit-in in Gwangju, South Korea

South Korean soldiers arresting student protestors

Parents mourning their children, many of them university students, who died in the Gwangju Massacre,

The South Korean military under Chun Doo-hwan indiscriminately killed protestors

“People in their 20s, especially college students, have led social transformation,” says Yang. “In the 80s, students were the leading group of democratization. And if you look at Korean history, these youth groups were always actively participating in more transformative, progressive activism. But, then during the Moon Jae-in government, young men in their 20s and 30s became more conservative, especially in the last two elections.”

THE PEOPLE BEHIND THE FAR RIGHT

Yoon’s supporters, whether they be young voters in their 20s or devout Christians who are 60 and older, are unionized by a few overarching causes – anti-communism, anti-North Korea, anti-China, conservative fiscal and social politics, religion, and pro-Americanism. The Yoon supporters protesting in Seoul and the White Skulls storming the Constitutional Court have dominated headlines. But, because of this sudden onset of massive attention, they’re mistaken for starting an entirely new movement.

Chang and Jang talk about what their friends, loved ones, and acquaintances are tired of when it comes to politics.

“People are tired of wokeism,” says Chang who immediately jumps to the next major issue among young voters. “But, also, the housing crisis in Korea. The previous president tried to fix it, no fix. Yoon tried to fix it, no fix. That’s the number one thing people are really concerned about—housing.”

Chang recounts, “I went to high school there, and a lot of my friends would say, ‘Hell Joseon;’ basically, ‘Korea is Hell.’ You can't get a job, even when from birth, you work non-stop, go to these academies, study hard, and you either have to be super smart or work super hard, or a mixture of both. Even if you go to a good college, you have no job, you can't buy a house.”

“Your parents are dying, everyone has lung cancer, and then, you have to go to the army, if you're a man. So, everyone just personifies Korea as a doomed country; a lot of young people view Korea like that. North Korea is a real problem. Japan is a real problem. China is a real problem. Now, the US is kind of a real problem too.”

Similarly, Jang says there are really only three issues that South Koreans are concerned about.

“일단은, 다른 가치관이나 신념같은 거는, 한국에서 제일 중요한 부류가 정치에서 세 가지 부류가 있거든요,” says Jang. “첫째는 경제이고, 두 번째는 부동산 정책이고, 세 번째는 북한 관련된 이거든요—친미를 할 것인지, 친북을 할 것인지, 친중을 할 것인지. 한국이, 아시다시피, 분단국가 잖아요, 개전 상태고. 근데, 보통은 민주당 쪽이 집권을 하면 친북을 한 단 말이에요. 약간 느슨하게 대우해주고 지원해주고. 그런데, 저는, 개인적으로는, 제 신념상, 저 북한테 돈을 퍼주는 행위는 별로 좋아하지 않아서, 좀 더 강경하게 대북정책을 펼치는 보수쪽 진영을 지지하고 있습니다.”

Translation: “First of all, in terms of beliefs and values, there are three main ones that are most important in Korea. The first is the economy, the second is real estate policy, and the third is North Korea-related—will you be pro-American, pro-North Korea, or pro-Chinese? But, as you know, Korea is a divided country, it's in a state of war. But, usually, when the Democratic Party has power, they are pro-North Korea. They treat them a little more leniently and support them. But, personally, based on my beliefs, I don't really like giving money to North Korea which is why I support the conservative party that pursues more hardline North Korean policies.”

The issues that Chang and Jang discuss were also relevant in the mid-1900s and are prevalent now because of geopolitical events that happened 75 years ago. 뉴라이트 or 일민주의, directly translated to “New Right” or “the One-People Principle,” technically/officially built their political coalition in the early 2000s when the conservative political bloc fought to regain power in response to consecutive Democratic candidates winning an election that was traditionally dominated by the Republican party. Some of the most prominent groups aligned with this movement are the White Skull Corps and the 태극기 부대 (Taegeukgi Budae) or the national-flag brigade. In addition to all of the aforementioned values that the New Right platforms, their policies are based in national and ethnic hegemony, believing that national and ethnic South Koreans should be prioritized because of ethnic superiority.

These New Right philosophies are directly derived from the rhetoric of previous military dictators, the most prominent of which being Rhee Syng Man and Park Chung Hee. On par with aligning themselves with such figureheads, the New Right considers Rhee Syngman as the founding father of the Republic of Korea instead of an authoritarian who controlled elections for more than a decade and Park Chung Hee as the father of national modernization instead of a military dictator who killed activists and protestors. Even surrounding the events of the Gwangju uprising and the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s where South Korean civilians sacrificed their lives to fight for a democracy, the New Right delegitimizes it and paints it as pro-communist, pro-North Korean, and radically liberal insurgents toppling the Republic.

Although officially referred to and technically functioning as a democracy, South Korea has been under the rule of military dictators up until as recently as the 1990s. Rhee Syng Man, Park Chung Hee, and Chun Doo Hwan suppressed democracy for the latter half of the 20th century, stunting the country's political structures.

“Obviously, some people were critical of the repressive dictatorship, but if you were critical, you could be accused of being a pro-North Korean follower or dangerous figure,” explains Yang. “So, there was this strong punishment against people who were very critical, whether they were communist or not. They actually cultivated a strong idea of anti-communism and North Korea being evil. They didn't need to think deeply about why communism is bad. But, you know, they were just inculcated all the time.”

Because of this inculcation, civilians during that time and older generations today are able to contend with this brutal end of the Seoul Spring. This perspective alongside the rapid economic growth and industrialization brought by Chun further instilled the belief that authoritarianism was beneficial.

“A lot of them spent their young lives witnessing a rapidly growing economy. And a lot of them could improve their living standards—they had abundant job opportunities, they had fast wage growth, etc. They actually moved up to the status of middle class around that time, so they attributed the successful economic development of South Korea to Park Chung-hee’s strong leadership.” Yang expands that “the older generations have very strong generational political identities shaped by their historical collective experience of the Korean War and the military regime. That’s how they became supportive of the conservative government.”

From this 40-year period in South Korean history, the military generals and politicians who worked with Chun, Park and even Rhee and were complicit in violently suppressing civilian outcry remained and continue to be major leading politicians in the country’s biggest political parties, including the ruling People Power Party. Even the first “democratically elected” president of South Korea in 1987, Roh Tae Woo, was a crucial and involved military general who helped Chun take control of the military and government and wage them as fighting forces to kill hundreds to thousands of protestors.

In addition to how modern South Korea’s cultural society of “social rigidity, conformism, restricted freedom of expression, lack of openness and personal expression, deeply-rooted patriarchy, and extreme obsession with work and efficiency” are ingrained by the dictators that led with these values, the country’s dictators have similarly left a political world that is fractured, unstable, exclusive, opaque, oligarchical, inaccessible and constantly changing.

Just looking at how the ruling conservative party in South Korea formed throughout history below shows how the authoritarian values of Rhee’s, Park’s and Chung’s administrations have never been eradicated but rather repackaged as nationalism and anti-communism.

THE HOLY TRINITY: CHRISTIANITY, ANTI-COMMUNISM AND PRO-AMERICANISM

There are a few key demographics and unifying beliefs that identify what portion of the Korean public supports Yoon and why. The most prominent values of this group are religious, often guided by Christian conservatism, pro-Americanism, a rejection of radical feminism and frustration with a stagnating economy that is making it increasingly impossible for young people to accrue financial independence and power.

When asking 22-year-old Chang Si-on about his concerns of the South Korean economy, politics and potential solutions, he says, “Korea should become a state of the U.S…If you’ve ever lived in Korea for a long period of time, especially, went to school in Korea, you could clearly see that it has a lot of systemic issues.” He emphasizes, “You can’t fix the country by fixing the politics. You have to fix the systemic issues…And I think there is no way to fix Korea. There has to be a radical overhaul of everything, especially the Korean people.”

This partiality towards the US and against communism is ingrained in all Koreans regardless of political affiliation. But what makes it uniquely influential to the People Power Party and its supporters are three fronts: religion, specifically Christianity, ethno-superiority and nationally conservative anti-communism. All three combine to motivate the elderly far-right conservatives.

“In addition to anti-communism, pro-Americanism, they are also very strongly anti-LGBTQ. If you go to those protests, they attack sexual minorities. In addition to this elderly population and young men, evangelical devotees are another important constituency of right-wing movements,” explains Yang.

“Korean evangelical churches are directly influenced by the American ones. Some of the church pastors from the US come to Korea to deliver the Gospel, etc. So, there is a direct link. And then, a lot of ideas are also borrowed from the American churches.”

While both the People Power Party and the Democratic Party of Korea have anti-communist stances, the latter is more lenient, progressive, and inclusive on these issues. More importantly, the Democratic Party is more flexible on North Korea-related policies, than the PPP (People Power Party) is.

“One thing that overarches all the things that you mentioned, is the very aggressive anti- communist movement that defined the authoritarian period and religion was no exception.”

Fear of communism can be traced back to the Korean War where the United States played a significant role in defending and fighting with South Korean soldiers.

This American sponsored portrayal of the war is deeply steeped with American propaganda that has ingrained a view of the United States among South Koreans as the “savior” of the free world. Even the language surrounding the discussion and education of the Korean War is both subconsciously and plainly biased. The reality, however, of the South Korean-US relationship and the true intentions harbored by the US throughout history is more so one of exploitation and neo-colonialism, which is often overshadowed by this popular rhetoric and perception of, as Yang says, a country that “saved South Korea from evil communism.”

US military defense seemed to be the reason why South Korea had any chance to defend itself against the communist forces of the Soviet Union and North Korea. However, it was American involvement itself that arguably caused a legacy of pain and fragmentation that could have been entirely avoided. Instead of returning autonomy to South Korea after Japan had surrendered to the Allies and subsequently passed control of South Korea to the US and the Soviet Union, both nations created an arbitrary division at the 38th parallel allowing the Soviet Union to establish a proxy communist government in the north and the US to establish a proxy military government in the south. This inevitably led to tensions between the colonies resulting in what is now known as the Korean War.

Despite the physical, psychological, and infrastructural damage the war caused, American perception of North Korea and their positioning as an indispensable South Korean partner remains a fixed truth for many Koreans.

When I asked Chang why he thought pro-Yoon supporters were waving American flags, he responded that it represented “strong sentiments against North Korea.”

“The left-leaning party is nice to North Korea. Do you deal with criminals, or do you deal with prisoners? No, because they're in prison for a reason. So, I don't think we should deal with North Korea. They're going to try to play South Korea out of their money, out of their power. We have US bases for a reason, we have to keep them afar. A lot of the people who are backing Yoon are honestly afraid of North Korea; we shouldn’t be giving aid to them or anything. And I think they (Yoon supporters) are strongly standing behind the US-Korea alliance.”

This flawed and one-sided view of the United States is the result of over a hundred years of American involvement. And while beliefs of anti-communism, pro-Americanism, and Christianity are more strongly associated with the far right movement, these beliefs are perpetuated and remain popular in the greater South Korean psyche.

Hong summarizes that “overall, the anti-communist education indoctrination campaign was really strong before the democratization of the country, and it has been politically used.”

“There are generations who were dominantly socialized during that period. And then, socialization is such an important force as well—it's very hard to turn away from how you were socialized. And that was the passive socialization for a lot of people who are now in their late 60s, 70s, and older. And then, also these generations contributed to the initial development of the country and are very proud of it because of how many difficulties they had to overcome. This combination of a strong ideological movement and the economic contributions they and the regime made, they think that this is how the nation was built which reinforces their belief in these (far-right) movements.”

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVEMENT NOW THAT YOON’S BEEN IMPEACHED

On April 4th, 2025, the Constitutional Court voted unanimously to uphold the National Assembly’s ruling to impeach Yoon and remove him from office. While this provides somewhat of a definitive conclusion to Yoon’s political career, the implications of the past four months of protests, violence, and conspiracies remain unknown. Korean voters, politicians, political experts, and journalists are divided on the true implications of the crisis that emerged from just one man. Opinions vary from treating the events surrounding Yoon’s impeachment as a blip in South Korea’s political history to an irreversible undermining of democracy and a permanent emboldening of the New Right movement.

Journalists like Seoul-based LA Times reporter Max Kim don't believe that “this ‘movement’ has any real staying power.” He explained, “Part of this is that I don't think Yoon has nearly the sort of fandom that, say, Trump or any more successful demagogue does. Many are forgetting that the same exact set of protesters who are getting endless media coverage today could be found in Seoul every weekend for years, dismissed by everyone as fanatics and wingnuts. In South Korea, there are no real wedge issues — like immigration in the U.S. — that lend itself to the kind of reactionary surge you are seeing in the U.S. or Europe.”

For those like Hong, Yang, and Jang who are concerned about both Yoon’s actions and the far-right movement’s response to it are concerned on three fronts — the endorsement and actual utilization of violence, the delegitimization of democratic processes, and the adoption of effective mobilization tactics:

According to Yang, “This is very concerning because they are not just like conservative or right-wing people. They are supporting explicit violence and attacking minorities. Until now, right-wingers used a lot of hate speech but they never actually used violence as a tactic. But now, they are actively doing it, and a lot of politicians are fueling these violent narratives and tactics. I think it's already threatening democracy because the politicians in the People Power Party are saying that the Constitutional Court is biased and the judges are not capable of being unbiased so that's basically attacking the legitimacy of the Constitution, state institutions, laws, etc. So, yeah, this can be very dangerous, and it's already damaged democracy in a pretty significant way, and it will set a really negative precedent for the future of democracy.”

And, in Hong’s view, “Conservative right wing party politics have always been mainstream. What is different now is that, thanks to digital technology, extreme right wing YouTubers are super popular and conspiracy theories are thriving. In the past, a lot of street protests were done by the left side rather than the right-wing, but now you can see that they have grown a lot in terms of their mobilization capacity, so that is new. Since 2015, there has been this broad political coalition among right wing civic organizations, evangelical churches, and right wing influencers. So, now they have enormous capacity in terms of movement that could mobilize on a large scale.”

While the country’s democracy was narrowly saved, the New Right movement now knows what digital, social media, news, organizing and protesting strategies are effective, from observing Trump’s efficacy as a politician and from being emboldened by Yoon and his political supporters, and they will likely engage the same strategies again in the future.